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by Dorothy Mahan

Compared to international conflicts, civil wars last longer, kill more people and are far more resistant to peaceful settlements, a local university expert recently told more than 100 members of the United Nations Association at Carolina Meadows.

“There were 80 percent more civil wars from 1945 to 1999 than international wars,” said Navin Bapat, assistant professor in the Peace, War and Defense program at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

He said 87 percent of all conflicts following World War II involved both a “state” and “non-state” actor, referring to official governments versus insurgent groups.

Bapat defined civil war as “an insurgency or terrorist campaign on a large-enough scale such that (at least) 1,000 people die, both civilian and military personnel.”

To understand these conflicts, he argues for a scientific approach to remove emotional responses and to make precise definitions.

The process begins with the development of hypotheses that are tested using data collection and case studies, he said: “The goal is to be as transparent as possible as to how to get the information and what assumptions we are making.”

But in his study of militant non-state actors, the problem of deception exists. 

“My subject actively lies to me!” he said. “To compensate for this, we often develop models based on the field of game theory.”

Game theory is defined as using mathematical models to explain behavior in strategic situations in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, according to Wikipedia.  “Game theoretic models allow us to incorporate what we know from previous studies and apply this to understand the logic of current problems,” Bapat said.

The Afghanistan war illustrates these issues. In a difficult decision, the Obama administration chose General Stanley McChrystal’s “surge” plan to deploy troops into Afghanistan.

Bapat uses logic and previous patterns in civil wars to develop a prediction: “We don’t know if it will work, but the surge does provide a slight, temporary increase in the probability that the Taliban will disarm. But the policy is unsustainable, and it removes (Afghani President) Karzai’s incentive to end the conflict.”

Bapat said the game theory becomes clear in analyzing the choices. To stop the conflict, Karzai could negotiate with the Taliban to form a unity government. But this would be politically costly because the U.S. is giving aid to Karzai to keep the Taliban out of power. Karzai is being rewarded for fighting the Taliban and has no incentive to end the conflict, he said.

Karzai sees that if the U.S. leaves he would probably have to negotiate, Bapat said, and he also knows that the U.S. politically cannot allow the Taliban to take control of the government.

“We therefore see something perverse: Karzai uses the threat of bringing the Taliban into government to force the U.S. to keep supporting him.”

As the surge is increasingly politicized, it likely will continue, and U.S. aid will increase but with little result against the Taliban. On the other hand, if politicization is removed, the best policy for Obama is to withdraw aid and troops, Bapat said. “This illustrates the problem of relying solely on emotions and less on logic.”

“The dilemma of U.S. policy makers is that Obama wants to keep the Taliban out of power and uses Karzai as an agent to fight the Taliban,” Bapat concluded. “But Karzai’s goal is to stay in power, not necessarily to fight the Taliban.  He therefore doesn’t have the incentive to eliminate the Taliban completely. We see Karzai offering to negotiate with the Taliban but then subsequently engaging in greater corruption and patronage.”

For information and membership on the monthly UNA Lunch and Learn meetings, call Barbara Rodbell at 919-942-1239.

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